Authority signaling: How relational interactions between journalists and politicians create primary definers in UK broadcast news by Chadwick, Andrew et al.
This is an Open Access document downloaded from ORCA, Cardiff University's institutional
repository: http://orca.cf.ac.uk/123770/
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted to / accepted for publication.
Citation for final published version:
Chadwick, Andrew, McDowell-Naylor, Declan, Smith, Amy P. and Watts, Ellen 2018. Authority
signaling: How relational interactions between journalists and politicians create primary definers in
UK broadcast news. Journalism 10.1177/1464884918762848 file 
Publishers page: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1464884918762848
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1464884918762848>
Please note: 
Changes made as a result of publishing processes such as copy-editing, formatting and page
numbers may not be reflected in this version. For the definitive version of this publication, please
refer to the published source. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite
this paper.
This version is being made available in accordance with publisher policies. See 
http://orca.cf.ac.uk/policies.html for usage policies. Copyright and moral rights for publications
made available in ORCA are retained by the copyright holders.
1Authority Signaling: How Relational Interactions between Journalists and Politicians 
Create Primary Definers in U.K. Broadcast News 
Andrew Chadwick, Declan McDowell-Naylor, Amy P. Smith, & Ellen Watts 
Andrew Chadwick is Professor of Political Communication in the Centre for Research in 
Communication and Culture and the Department of Social Sciences at Loughborough University. 
Email: a.chadwick@lboro.ac.uk
Declan McDowell-Naylor, Amy P. Smith, and Ellen Watts are doctoral researchers and research 
assistants in the New Political Communication Unit at Royal Holloway, University of London. Email: 
Declan.Mcdowell-Naylor.2013@live.rhul.ac.uk; Amy.Smith.2011@live.rhul.ac.uk; 
Ellen.Watts.2012@live.rhul.ac.uk
This research was funded by a grant to Andrew Chadwick from the British Academy and the 
Leverhulme Trust (#SG151065); he thanks their generous support. 
Forthcoming in Journalism. 
Authors’ accepted manuscript. Please read the final, typeset version of this article when it is 
published at http://journals.sagepub.com/home/jou
2Abstract  
How journalists construct the authority of their sources is an essential part of how news 
comes to have power in politics and how political actors legitimize their roles to publics. 
Focusing on economic policy reporting and a dataset of 133 hours of mainstream broadcast 
news from the five-week 2015 U.K. general election campaign, we theorize and empirically 
illustrate how the construction of expert source authority works. To build our theory we 
integrate four strands of thought: an important, though in recent years neglected, tradition in 
the sociology of news concerned with “primary definers”; the underdeveloped literature on 
expert think tanks and media; recent work in journalism studies advocating a relational 
approach to authority; and elements from the discursive psychology approach to the 
construction of facticity in interactive settings. Our central contribution is a new perspective 
on source authority: the identification of behaviors that are key to how the interactions 
between journalists and elite political actors actively construct the elevated authoritative 
status of expert sources. We call these behaviors authority signaling. We show how authority 
signaling works to legitimize the power of the U.K.’s most important policy think tank and 
discuss the implications of this process. 
Keywords 
Journalism, sources, authority signaling, primary definers, discourse, power, legitimacy, 
broadcast news 
3The consequences of how journalists use sources is an enduring object of communication 
research. From work on the sociology of journalism in the 1970s and 1980s to the turn 
toward “indexing” and “framing” in the 1990s, through to recent analyses of how digital 
media are reshaping power in news making, the question of who has voice and authority in 
mediated constructions of reality remains central to how we interrogate journalism’s claim to 
represent the world (see for example Bennett, 1990; Carlson, 2017; Franklin & Carlson, 
2010; Gans, 1979; Tuchman, 1978; Zelizer, 1990). 
How journalists construct the authority of their sources is an essential part of how 
news comes to have power in politics and how political actors legitimize their roles to the 
public. When power is legitimized, it becomes authority, which in turn leads to action that 
makes a difference. Key here is how the authority of sources is maintained by the kind of 
interactive work among journalists and sources that news logics demand. This matters for all 
areas of journalism but is particularly important for policy news. In this field, patterned 
inequalities in the representation of sources may, over time, serve to narrow public debate 
and privilege some perspectives over others. We therefore begin from the normative principle 
that when journalists source they ought to give public voice to a diverse range of policy 
perspectives. And policy news in particular should empower citizens to understand and 
choose from among a wide range of possible alternatives. 
In this study we theorize and empirically illustrate how the construction of source 
authority works. We do so by focusing on an area of news that has grown increasingly 
important in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of the last decade: economic policy 
reporting. Our central contribution is a new perspective on source authority, namely the 
identification of behaviors we suggest are key to how the interactions between journalists and 
elite political actors actively construct the elevated authoritative status of expert sources. We 
call these behaviors authority signaling. 
4We analyzed a sample of 169 programs (133 hours) of mainstream broadcast news 
during the five-week 2015 U.K. general election campaign. Our sample (see Table 1) 
consisted of the main mass-audience evening news bulletins on the U.K’s five most-watched 
television channels, together with BBC Radio 4’s mass-audience morning news show, Today. 
We show how authority signaling among elite journalists and political actors worked to 
legitimize and enhance the power of what has become the U.K.’s most important 
nongovernmental policy organization—the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS). 
Founded in 1969 by four City of London financiers, today the IFS is an independent, 
nonpartisan think tank of 40 full-time economists. It specializes in accessible but narrowly-
drawn analyses of taxation and spending policy, which perennially dominate the news cycle 
following government budget announcements and party election manifesto launches. Just as 
importantly, however, with its focus on “deficit reduction” defined as “balancing the books,” 
and its constant use of the national-economy-as-household-budget metaphor—widely 
criticized by Keynesian economists such as Joseph Stiglitz—the IFS has played a significant 
role in legitimizing the idea that austerity was an unavoidable policy response to the crisis 
(Anstead & Chadwick, 2018: 248–249).  
The IFS is also the epitome of a media-savvy expert source. In a study of ideological 
balance in the use of think tanks in 30,000 BBC news and current affairs programs from 2009 
and 2015, Lewis and Cushion (2017: 11–12) showed that the IFS was overwhelmingly the 
most prominent think tank. In fact, its dominance is extraordinary: in 2009 it made up 47 
percent of all references to think tanks in BBC news programmes and was mentioned eight 
times as often as the second-ranked think tank; by 2015 this had reached 54 percent/five 
times. But how does the IFS achieve and maintain that status? And what can this tell us about 
the construction of source authority more generally? 
5Our study is divided into two main parts. We begin with our theory of authority 
signaling. Here we integrate four strands of thought that have hitherto remained separate: an 
important, though in recent years neglected tradition in the sociology of news concerned with 
“primary definers”; the relatively underdeveloped literature on expert think tanks and media; 
recent work in journalism studies that advocates a relational approach to authority; and 
finally, elements from the discursive psychology approach to the construction of facticity in 
interactive settings. In the second part of the article, we show how authority signaling works 
in practice, drawing upon our content analysis of mass-audience broadcast television and 
radio news from the 2015 election. 
Sources and Primary Definers 
The starting point for our theory of authority signaling is Stuart Hall and colleagues’ classic 
work on “primary definers,” which emerged in their influential 1978 study of the social 
construction of news (Hall, et al., 1978: 53–77). Hall et al. argued that elite media reproduce 
social consensus, not because they are inherently biased, but because they routinely work in 
relations of reciprocal interdependence with institutional elites. In opposition to 
instrumentalist accounts that focus on direct political interference by editors and proprietors, 
Hall et al. (1978: 57) argued that media organizations tend to gravitate toward “regular and 
reliable institutional sources.” Key here is that professional journalists obtain and present 
statements from those who operate outside the journalism field. Not only does such 
information enhance the credibility of journalists’ stories, it also serves to legitimize 
journalism’s role as provider of “objective” coverage of contentious issues. 
Non-governmental expert sources like think tanks, whose status is based on specialist 
knowledge of policy, are important, though often neglected, candidates for primary definer 
status. In the U.K. and other media systems with strong public service traditions, expert 
6primary definers are particularly significant for enabling professional media organizations to 
maintain public service impartiality norms. They provide journalists with valuable 
opportunities to comment on sectional partisan conflicts by promoting “independent” and 
“authoritative” judgments on public policy and the behavior of political elites. Experts allow 
journalists to invoke information and opinion that is “external” to partisan conflict and to act 
in the political field while remaining insulated from accusations of partisan capture or bias. 
These are important resources for maintaining a news organization’s credibility, not least 
because professional journalists have long been ambivalent about their own expertise. Gans 
(1979: 129), for example, found that journalists were wary of crossing the boundary between 
a “generalist” journalistic culture and the culture of specialized, scientific knowledge. 
Ekström (2002), Schudson and Anderson (2009: 99), and Reich (2012) have all drawn 
attention to journalism’s dual institutional role as chronicler of public events and relatively 
passive assembler of perspectives supplied by others.  
In the U.K. several recent trends in the coverage of election campaigns further 
strengthen expert think tanks’ power as sources. Cushion (2015) has documented the rise of 
journalistic interventionism and “interpretive news” while Cushion and Thomas (2017) have 
shown that news values-based, qualitative, editorial judgments about how to cover campaigns 
are becoming more important than quantitative, stopwatch-measured approaches. Meanwhile, 
a study by Cushion et al. (2016) revealed that newspaper sources are important influences on 
broadcast news agendas but the BBC is least likely to follow the papers’ agendas. We suggest 
that think tanks benefit from these developments because editors and journalists are more 
likely to invoke expert sources in addition to their own experience and knowledge when they 
intervene in campaigns to hold politicians to account. And at the BBC in particular, editors 
and journalists are attracted to think tanks because they help avoid over-dependence on 
7newspaper agendas. Thus, while many professional journalists might be ambivalent about 
becoming experts, they certainly rely upon them in assembling news. 
Think tanks are equally useful to political elites, who seek credible support for their 
policies from outside the partisan field (Schlesinger, 2009). Evidence from think tanks is 
often mobilized by politicians eager to present “objective” evidence for their chosen policy 
preferences. For politicians, mobilizing experts to preempt journalists’ criticisms is preferable 
to directly confronting journalists because open conflict might harm reciprocal relationships. 
Thus, like journalists, politicians who make media appearances have strong incentives to 
signal the authority of experts.  
We suggest that the expert organizations that are routinely invoked in these 
interactions are likely to have their authority enhanced as part of the process. While this 
relates to a more general and well-known perspective that there is resource exchange among 
journalists and politicians, we want to draw attention to the often-overlooked role of 
institutionalized expert knowledge as a fundamental intermediary in this process. To adapt 
Davis’ terminology (2009), we see expert sources as an important part of the “mediated 
reflexivity” that now characterizes interactions in the “dance” among political actors and 
mainstream journalists. As we will show, experts can provide the all-important music that 
enables the dance. Professional journalists need political elites and political elites need 
professional journalists; both need expert sources. In the long run, media organizations and 
politicians may become structurally subordinate to these kinds of sources, to the detriment of 
source diversity, and this is the essence of Hall et al.’s original theory of primary definers. 
Think Tanks as Expert Sources 
There is convincing evidence that expert sources have generally become much more 
prominent in news over recent years (Albæk, 2011). The think tank field has evolved, as the 
8discourse of scientific objectivity and “pure” research that animated the mid-twentieth 
century emergence of expert policy organizations has partly been displaced by the discourse 
of the “marketplace of ideas,” in which competitiveness, promotion, and political advocacy 
are more central (Rich and Weaver, 2000). 
With few exceptions (Anstead and Chadwick, 2018; Lewis and Cushion, 2017) little 
systematic research exists on how U.K. think tanks interact with media, despite the fact that 
these are not simply lone individuals but reasonably well-resourced bodies, and, moreover, 
bodies that do not possess the same status as academics and universities. Some studies make 
passing mentions of the importance of agenda-setting but little attempt has been made to 
explain the mechanisms through which this typically occurs (Cockett, 1995; Stone, 1996).  
In their work on think tanks and coverage in six U.S. newspapers, Rich and Weaver 
(2000) were concerned with the relationships between think tanks’ “media visibility” and 
their organizational, geographical, and financial characteristics. We think it important to 
explain the deeper origins of “media visibility.” We should examine the discursive work that 
must be performed by journalists, politicians, and experts themselves if an expert’s authority 
is to be legitimized. We therefore focus on how expert authority comes to be constructed 
through a set of discursive moves we term authority signaling. An expert organization’s 
resources for acting powerfully are partly endogenous to the mediated contexts within which 
they are presented. How experts are constructed by media in the first place plays a role in 
maintaining the power that experts need to act in the political field. Expert sources come to be
experts not simply because they possess authority that is intrinsically “theirs” but because, 
through relational interactions, they are discursively constructed as authoritative and 
independent. 
Authority as Relational and Discursively Performed 
9Making sense of this process entails identifying patterns in the language journalists and 
politicians use to describe sources. When editorial decisions are made that lead some sources 
to be routinely described in favorable ways, this is likely to shape how publics come to 
interpret the structure of debate—who has authority and who lacks it; who deserves blame 
and who escapes it (Downey and Toynbee, 2016). 
As Carlson argues, “authority is the central element that makes journalism work,” not 
least because “audiences expect journalists to know and to communicate their knowing” 
(2017: 5, 7). We can add to this Edelman’s (1988: 20) useful definition of authority: 
“willingness to suspend one’s own critical judgment in favor of someone regarded as able to 
cope creates authority.” The suspension of critical judgement in favor of expertise is the key 
force here, and it is crucial for understanding how and why certain institutions seem to escape 
critical media scrutiny while others are required to continually defend their positions. Yet 
authority cannot be taken for granted; it must be actively constructed and is best seen, not as 
an intrinsic property that inheres in individuals and organizations but “relationally… as an 
understanding formed through the interactions among all the actors necessary for journalism 
to exist” (Carlson, 2017: 7). Experts may possess a resource (knowledge) that is unevenly 
distributed throughout society, but they still need to perform their expertise discursively. And 
think tanks in particular must work in settings that provide access to professional media, who 
have the resources to enable that performance. In turn, the performance of professional media 
and journalists depends upon the presence of experts. Mediated interactions are thus 
generative of political authority. Political authority is not a “thing” that exists anterior to 
media. It is, to borrow Herbst’s term (2003: 489), “media-derived” and requires public 
maintenance, though the extent of this process can vary in its breadth and depth. 
The Work That Words Do 
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Sometimes, simple labeling is all it takes. Key adjectives such as “independent,” “impartial,” 
“non-partisan” or “respected” can perform a great deal of work in the everyday construction 
of an expert as sitting outside the partisan and journalistic fields. At other times, in the 
intensively scripted and highly stylized environment of broadcast news (Craig, 2016; 
Ekström, 2002), where templates strongly shape reporting and every word and every edit 
count, a simple, unadorned description of an expert’s views may also do the work. In their 
analysis of the use of statistics in U.K. broadcast news, Cushion, Lewis, and Callaghan 
(2016: 9) found that 23.5 percent of statistical claims were vague and used in passing without 
evidence, while 41.3 percent lacked context, analysis or discussion. In broadcast political 
reporting, vague mentions of this kind are particularly likely to be powerful in constructing 
authority, especially if there is no juxtaposition of an actor’s views with others’ views in the 
same segment or if other actors are treated with contrasting skepticism. Here, it is the simple 
presentation, without qualifying words or phrases, that comes to perform the discursive work 
that conveys authority. In contexts like policy news, when there is always scope for 
contestation, and when other voices are not juxtaposed, verbs like “said,” “says,” “is” are not 
unproblematically neutral. 
After all, authority also depends on what Latour and Woolgar, in their analysis of the 
discourses of scientific empiricism, identified as the hierarchy of “modalities” (1986: 77–88, 
176-177). This concept captures how qualifying phrases serve to enhance or diminish the 
authority of what might, at first glance, appear to be simple factual statements. Modalities are 
used by speakers to signal the tentative nature of a fact. For example, a speaker might say “I 
think that...,” “it is possible that...” “it has been said...” that X is the case. These are 
statements loaded with relatively strong modalities that qualify the facticity of the account 
being presented. They are means by which a speaker may signal factual “weight” and, by 
association, the authority of the speaker making the statement. In contrast, at the top of the 
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evidentiary hierarchy are statements with weaker modalities, such as “X is the case.” The 
most prized statements in scientific discourse are those without modalities, where a fact can 
simply be presupposed and does not require adornment: it is something that is simply “out 
there,” beyond disagreement. The formulation here (simply “X”) serves as the strongest 
expression of the authority of the fact and, by extension, the speaker stating the fact in that 
moment. In broadcast news, a medium of few words, the simple statement of an actor’s views 
without modalities can be a powerful means of constructing an actor’s authority. 
Concepts from the field of discursive psychology are also instructive for 
understanding the language that elevates experts’ authority. Potter’s (1996) analyses of news 
discourse suggested that journalist-source interactions typically feature two specific 
strategies: “interest management” and “category entitlement.” Interest management refers to 
how speakers that have an interest in events being reported in a specific way must actively 
“work up” their own authority, and, by extension, the authority of their selected sources, by 
avoiding revealing their own self-interest. Category entitlement refers to how categories are 
used to establish a speaker’s “right” to know something. Drawing upon Goffman’s (1981) 
concept of “footing,” Potter (1996: 15) argues that in news interviews speakers use linguistic 
devices to separate factual descriptions “from their own interests and produce them as neutral 
and external,” for example by referring to some notional consensus away from the immediate 
interaction or by relying on the category entitlements of specific sources that are presupposed 
to be qualified to speak. These must be individuals, groups or organizations that can lay some 
claim to knowledge that is separate from the interests of the speakers involved in the 
immediate interaction (Potter, 1996: 125). Speakers can also “inoculate” themselves against 
being presented as having interests that affect what they say. For example, they can present 
“vague or formulaic descriptions” (Potter, 1996: 118) sufficient to pre-empt the criticism that 
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a speaker lacks authority or has a selfish interest in the account being presented in a certain 
way. 
We want to suggest that in broadcast news journalism these discursive strategies 
converge and result in the authority signaling of expert sources. We should expect, for 
example, that a political party representative will be presented as having interests that 
discount her ability to speak objectively. An independent expert, on the other hand, is likely 
to be presented by a journalist as not having a particular interest and as having a category 
entitlement to speak on a policy issue. We should expect an expert source’s role in the 
interaction to be enhanced by language that conveys category entitlement, through words 
such as “independent” or “respected” or language that is not loaded with modalities, such as a 
bare description of the expert’s views or opinions as something that is accepted and 
“common sense.” At the same time, we might expect these descriptions to be repetitive and 
formulaic, almost casually inserted rather than elaborated upon, because elaboration invites 
other interview participants and, of course, audiences to pick over the details and find 
inconsistencies. 
Research Design and Method 
The 2015 UK general election campaign ran from March 30 to May 6. We undertook 
quantitative and qualitative analysis of all of the UK’s most popular broadcast news programs 
during this five-week period. We analyzed 169 programs, which amounted to 133.2 hours of 
coverage (see Table 1).1
—Table 1 here —
Our sampled programs are longstanding staples of political coverage from the main 
UK broadcasters. We wanted to capture the semantic contexts within which the IFS was 
presented, hence our decision to focus on the program segment as the unit of analysis. The 
segment has become an intuitive and instantly recognizable means by which editors divide up 
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content, manage their sources, and present evidentiary hierarchies, in a four-stage temporal 
process Hartley (1982: 118–119) defined as framing, focusing, realizing, and closing. As we 
define them in this study, segments can be either reports, interviews, or studio discussions. 
Segments begin with an opening statement from an interviewer or news anchor (framing) and 
then proceed through an interview or a discussion, or, in the case of a report, a series of video 
or graphics sequences and to-camera speech from reporters in the field or the studio 
interacting with sources (focusing and realizing). A segment closes when an interviewer or a 
news anchor wraps up with a short utterance, before moving on to the next segment. When it 
makes sense to refer to multiple instances of authority signaling within segments we do so 
(for example see Figure 2). 
Using the entire dataset of programs, we identified and catalogued all program 
segments in which the IFS featured. A total of 46 program segments—4.67 hours (3.5 
percent)—of coverage featured IFS personnel or opinion. These 46 segments formed the 
basis of our close analysis. Next, we developed a pilot coding frame. We broke authority 
signaling behavior down into three basic types: overt, assumed, and contested. Overt
authority signaling refers to language that clearly and overtly gave the impression that the 
IFS was authoritative, for example, when the organization was described as “independent” or 
“respected” through “footing” and the building of its category entitlement to speak. Second, 
and equally important for our theory, assumed authority signaling captures language that 
presented the IFS’s information, opinion or status as if they were simply “the facts” or 
“common sense” and beyond critique; in other words, where qualifying modalities were weak 
or entirely absent. The third category we developed was contested authority signaling, which 
refers to language that conveyed disagreement with the IFS’s information, opinion or status. 
We also wanted to identify the roles played by different actors in each segment, so we coded 
for when a news anchor, a reporter, or a political party representative signaled the IFS’s 
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authority. Finally, we also distinguished between direct appearances by party representatives 
and when journalists reported a party’s views.  
We tested the coding frame by having three members of the author team code a 
random sample of 14 news segments. After reviewing inter-coder reliability we removed 
variables with low reliability, simplified the coding frame, and underwent further discussion 
and coder training led by the lead author. We ran a second pilot on a different subsample of 
fifteen program segments to establish reliability for two new variables. Reliability 
(Krippendorff’s alpha) reached very good to excellent for all variables used in this article.2
Once the content analysis was completed we undertook detailed qualitative analysis of the 
episodes to reveal authority signaling at work. 
We acknowledge that there are limits to generalizing from a single case. However, a 
rich account of a single case can be useful for generating theory that might shape future 
empirical inquiry, and can introduce variables that might have been missed by previous 
research. 
Authority Signaling in Action: Analysis and Findings
We find significant evidence of authority signaling in the language of journalists and 
politicians, with examples ranging across the three types of signaling for which we coded. 
When describing the IFS, journalists in particular made significant use of category 
entitlement statements and statements with very weak or no modalities. This, coupled with 
their low levels of contestation of the IFS’s information and opinion, supports our theory that 
journalists played a key role in constructing the IFS’s authority. We also find that politicians 
enhanced the IFS’s authority, but in ways that were less straightforward, as we discuss in the 
following. We begin with some broad quantitative patterns. 
— Figure 1 here — 
15
 When news anchors signaled the authority of the IFS, they overwhelmingly 
constructed the think tank as authoritative (see Figure 1). Given the privileged role of anchors 
in framing news segments (Hartley, 1982: 119), this is a significant finding. Contestation of 
the IFS’s authority was also very rare among reporters, featuring in only two (4.3%) 
segments. Overt authority signaling was also frequent: news anchors used language that 
overtly constructed the IFS as authoritative in 10 (21.7%) segments; reporters did so in 9 
(19.6%) segments. 
However, journalists most frequently signaled the IFS’s assumed authority. The think 
tank’s opinions were presented as commonly accepted with seemingly no need for the 
journalist to explain the organization’s authority or justify their use of it as an expert source. 
Anchors constructed the IFS as possessing assumed authority in 20 (43.5%) segments, while 
reporters did so in 14 (30.4%) segments. 
 As we expected, journalists were not the only actors involved in this process. Twenty-
five of our 46 segments (54.3%) featured authority signaling by at least one non-journalistic 
organization. Political party sources accounted for the large majority of these, with 28 of 30 
separate instances of organizational authority signaling in those 25 segments (see Figure 2). 
This most frequently occurred when representatives of these parties appeared on the 
programs, though our research design also captured when reporters relayed parties’ views. 
— Figure 2 here — 
As Figure 2 reveals, politicians were more likely than journalists to contest the IFS’s 
authority and less likely than journalists to engage in overt authority signaling. That being 
said, the modal behavior among political sources was assumed authority signaling. As we 
discuss below, while the level of contestation varied between parties, throughout the news 
coverage politicians tended to use the IFS as a prop for their own perspectives, as we 
predicted. 
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We now analyze this and other facets of the discursive and relational construction of 
the IFS’s authority in a more granular way.
Assumed Authority Signaling 
Assumed authority signaling is the dominant discursive form in the construction of the IFS as 
a primary definer in broadcast news. It is characterized by statements with few or no 
modalities—there are no attempts to explain the organization’s authority nor justify its use as 
an expert source on economic policy. Instead, IFS interventions are regularly described 
without qualification, using simple verbs such as “said,” and “says.”  
We identified five key uses of assumed authority signaling. First, journalists sought to 
hold politicians to account by presenting the IFS, in contrast to politicians, as an informative 
or revealing source. Second, journalists used distinct metaphors to construct the IFS as 
possessing the authority to judge parties’ performances. Third, politicians benefited from the 
construction of the IFS as an external, impartial authority because they used the think tank to 
validate their policy claims. Fourth, we found almost no room for debate over the validity of 
IFS findings: “belief” in what the IFS said was constructed as an essential requirement for 
rational engagement in economic policy debate. Finally, journalists took a rather vague and 
formulaic approach: the IFS was a constant in economic reporting, forming a key part of the 
logic upon which journalists relied to create recognizable broadcast segments on economic 
policy during the election. 
Journalists used assumed authority signaling to mobilize opinion that was external to 
partisan conflict. Consider the following segment, in which Labour Party leader Ed Miliband 
has just raised his economic policy in an interview with Matt Barbet on 5 News Tonight:  
Ed Miliband: [...] that is the plan we offer for people in Scotland and indeed, across the 
United Kingdom. 
17
Matt Barbet: A plan that is short on detail. You talk about the mansion tax, bringing in 
enough to save the NHS. It will fall way short. You talk about a 50% tax rate, that will fall 
way short, according to the likes of the Institute for Fiscal Studies. How are you going to pay 
for all this?3
This segment was initially framed as a chance to “put the party leaders on the spot” and the 
IFS was used to hold Miliband’s claims to account. It was presented in Barbet’s focusing
with weak modalities as part of a strategy to evaluate Miliband’s economic plan. The use of 
the simple adverb “according” presents the IFS’s claims unproblematically, while the modal 
auxiliary verb “will,” used twice, conveys the certainty of the IFS’s claims. Barbet used IFS 
figures in a similar way when focusing during an interview with Liberal Democrat leader 
Nick Clegg. Here, Clegg had just finished a description of the Liberal Democrats’ economic 
policy:   
Matt Barbet: You say that, but what is lacking, glaringly, is the detail.  
Nick Clegg:  Not at all.
Matt Barbet: Today we’ve had a report from the Institute of Fiscal Studies, if you have a listen 
to this, warning that all the major parties, you included, that you have not provided anything 
like the full details on plans to cut the deficit. How can people properly decide if none of the 
parties, yours included, are being clear enough?
Nick Clegg:  I don’t think you are being entirely fair to your viewers. Actually, the IFS said the 
Liberal Democrats deserve what they call a small tick. They said we are the most transparent of 
the parties.
Matt Barbet: They said you are the best of a bad bunch. Which is what they said.
Nick Clegg:  There are certain things by the way, where you simply cannot cross the Ts and 
dot the Is before you come into government. We have gone considerably further and, as the IFS 
confirmed, as you know, we’ve always said we would balance the books, which is what Labour 
won’t do, but we will do it more fairly than the Conservatives.4
Similarly to Miliband, Clegg did not challenge the IFS’s authority. He disputed the accuracy 
of Barbet’s rendering of the IFS’s report but not the IFS itself (“as the IFS confirmed”), 
signaling the IFS’s assumed authority in the process. 
Constructions of the IFS’s assumed authority were present across all the news 
programs we analyzed. The Today program, for example, avoided using modalities and they 
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mobilized the organization frequently when challenging politicians on economic policy. In an 
interview with Conservative Theresa May, presenter John Humphrys engaged in realizing by 
doubting the Conservatives’ portrayal of Labour’s fiscal policy, citing the IFS’s opinion: 
“you’ve told us they’re (Labour) going to put up taxes by £3000, the Institute for Fiscal 
Studies rubbished that immediately. ‘Misleading,’ they said.”5 Humphrys did not expand on 
why it was misleading; the IFS said it was misleading, and so it was. Humphrys was not 
merely questioning May’s policy but placing seemingly irrefutable facts before her. Later in 
the interview, as it moved toward closure, this move was reinforced through Humphrys’ 
surprise at May’s support for her party’s statistics in the face of the evidence from the IFS 
that he had just established: “It really surprises me slightly that you’re sticking with that 
£3000 figure.” 
For journalists, this kind of approach serves a dual purpose: it enables them to 
challenge politicians while appearing as the neutral curators of the information of others 
rather than experts in their own right. Not only does this enhance the credibility of 
journalists’ narratives, it legitimizes their role as providers of credible, impartial coverage. 
Assumed authority signaling was also at work in the metaphors used to suggest that 
the IFS possessed the power to adjudicate on fiscal policy. Channel 4 News reporter Gary 
Gibbon used the metaphor of the courtroom, relying on the IFS and its director Paul Johnson 
to provide authoritative “judgment.”6 The report opened with Gibbon’s framing and focusing 
that the IFS had “judged that even in the first day of the campaign, standards of openness and 
accuracy were slipping.” A pre-recorded interview with Johnson was then used to realize
this, as Johnson was asked to give “marks out of ten for candor.” Johnson’s judgement that 
“we haven’t got a lot out of ten on either side” was then left hanging, with no further 
consideration, before the report moved onto a different subject. Similarly, in a 5 News 
Tonight segment the IFS was described as having “given a tick” to the Liberal Democrats, 
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constructing the IFS as though it were an accredited authority providing “official” 
assessments. These examples, which lacked modalities and depended on vagueness for their 
effects, enhanced the status of the IFS.
This was made doubly clear through the ways in which the IFS’s “godlike” role was 
manifested in declarations of faith through repeated invocations of “belief” in the IFS’s 
statements. In his Today interview with Theresa May, Humphrys attempted to close with a 
final challenge: “Well, do you not believe what the IFS said then?” The phrase “do you not 
believe” is different from asking May if she disagrees with the IFS; assumed authority 
signaling renders disagreement unavailable. May was left with only one option—to challenge 
the IFS on the basis of a lack of faith. However to do so would have involved challenging 
what the journalist has already established as the expert source, so she avoided contesting the 
IFS in her response and quickly moved the interview on. 
Finally, a key feature of assumed authority signaling was the repetitive and formulaic 
deployment of IFS opinion. Modality-free descriptions of the IFS and its reports were 
strategically inserted by journalists when politicians discussed economic policy. Stylized 
encounters resulted, indicating that the pressure of news production leads to the repetitive 
inclusion of reliable institutional sources. Examples from BBC News at Ten provide evidence 
of this. On two separate occasions, the BBC’s Economics Editor Robert Peston was framed
by his anchor as assessing party policy in closer detail. The format used on both occasions 
was identical: after summarizing the story, Peston realized it by referring to an IFS statement, 
and then cutting to an IFS representative to reinforce his line.7 In another segment led by 
Peston, the IFS was mentioned thirteen times in less than seven minutes.8 This usage became 
almost mundane, especially if we consider Peston’s repetitious use of the simple low-
modality phrase, “the IFS says….” Politicians also responded by using this same tactic, 
creating a shorthand form of facticity that worked to transcend their own self-interest. 
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Overt Authority Signaling  
Overt authority signaling relied on the repeated use of footing and category entitlements and 
a limited range of adjectives such as “independent” (which appeared in 14 segments), 
“expert” (5 segments), or “respected” (4 segments). Other terms included “clever,” 
“excellent,” “impartial,” “important,” “official,” and “sensible,” which featured in one 
segment each. 
 This extract from ITV News at Ten features some of the most explicit examples of 
overt authority signaling. 
Mary Nightingale (anchor, framing): The number-crunchers at The Institute for Fiscal 
Studies say there are genuine differences in the spending plans of the main political parties. 
But the IFS thinks voters are being left in the dark about exactly what those plans are. Our 
deputy political editor, Chris Ship, has been looking at the findings. 
Chris Ship (reporter, focusing): You may not have read through these four party manifestoes 
and costed their plans but you will be pleased to hear some very clever and very independent 
people have shone a spotlight on each. And their verdict is: they are all leaving the electorate 
somewhat in in the dark.9
The use of “number-crunchers,” “very clever,” and “very independent” demonstrates the use 
of footing and category entitlements to boost the authority of the IFS. The adverb “very” adds 
emphasis but so too does Chris Ship’s gentle admission that it was not he who had 
undertaken the analysis of the party manifestos but a “clever and independent” external 
organization. 
Similarly, when focusing a BBC News at Ten report on a Labour Party claim that full 
fiscal autonomy for Scotland (a key part of the Scottish National Party (SNP) argument for 
Scottish independence) would lead to a “spending hole” Peston referred to information from 
what he described as the “respected” IFS. Despite referring to the claim as originating from 
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Labour, neither he nor the anchor referred back to Labour in the remainder of the segment. 
Instead, the IFS’s analysis was used to explain the spending hole. Labour’s authority in 
making the claim was completely overtaken by the authority of the IFS, to the point where 
the segment became a report of the IFS’s assessment of Labour as much as it was of the 
SNP’s policies. 
This use of the IFS’s information to realize a news story that was ostensibly about 
claims made by a political party is an extreme form of journalistic distancing. Rather than 
rely on the party to provide information, which might require a reporter to present opinions 
from other parties as a means of showing impartiality, reporting from an IFS standpoint 
allows journalists to engage in footing to retain their impartiality and authority. The downside 
is that this kind of practice risks creating unbalanced reporting, as all IFS information is 
portrayed as accurate while opposing viewpoints from other expert sources and parties 
themselves are neglected. 
An interview with former Conservative Party chairman Grant Shapps for Newsnight 
also demonstrated how interest management enhanced the status of the IFS, with BBC 
journalists in particular using category entitlements as a resource to criticize politicians “from 
a distance.”10 Realizing using IFS statistics and continually referring to the think tank’s 
independence, anchor Evan Davis strongly and repeatedly criticized Shapps. Davis expressed 
complete disbelief in Shapps’ statements and implied that Shapps was an unreliable source 
due to his partisan interest in the argument. But by constructing the IFS as an independent 
authority entitled to speak on economic issues, Davis was able to frame this as the IFS’s 
“disbelief” rather than his own or the BBC’s. Davis challenged Shapps: “who do you think 
the public should believe? Do you think they should believe you, or do you think they should 
believe the independent fiscal experts of the Institute for Fiscal Studies?” Such favorable 
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treatment is a precious resource for any policy actor that seeks to become a regular and 
trusted source. 
When the authority of the IFS was signaled by both politicians and journalists, but for 
different ends, the central role of the think tank in U.K. economic news was thrown into stark 
relief. In an interview on the Today program both presenter Jim Naughtie and SNP 
spokesperson Derek Mackay invoked the IFS to support their arguments.11 Naughtie used 
category entitlement to refer to the organization as “independent” and then stated that as a 
result of the IFS’s analysis “there is absolutely no doubt that if you had full fiscal autonomy 
in the sense that Nicola Sturgeon means it, what you’d have to do in the Scottish Government 
is find an extra £7–8 billion, or find cuts.” He repeatedly referred to the IFS’s figures 
throughout this exchange and challenged Mackay’s argument that the SNP would not be 
forced into spending cuts. But rather than denounce the IFS’s figures, Mackay dodged the 
question before trying to use the same IFS report to lend authority to a different SNP policy. 
He then stated: “I’m not challenging the work that the IFS have done because the report also 
points out that…,” at which point he was cut off by Naughtie, who insisted that because 
Mackay accepted one aspect of the report he must, by logical extension, accept another: 
“Well you have to accept the £7 billion in cuts then.”  
As we have argued, the IFS becomes an expert source because, through it, both 
politicians and journalists can make their cases. It allows them to disagree without ultimately 
damaging their reciprocal relationships. In the interdependence that exists between journalists 
and politicians, where control passes back and forth between actors, externalizing the source 
of authority can be an important tool to manage disagreements and delineate roles. 
Contested Authority Signaling 
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As Figure 2 showed, politicians were far more likely than journalists to signal contestation of 
the IFS’s authority. We end by discussing some examples of this and we show why, in the 
final analysis, it does little damage to the IFS’s status as an expert source. 
A close examination of the interactions revealed that contestation occurred when a 
politician was responding to criticisms made by journalists or political rivals, prompting the 
politician to express (usually brief) disagreement. In other words, while politicians were 
willing to contest what the IFS said, they were much less likely to contest the IFS’s authority 
to say it. This is an important distinction. Conflict was mostly limited to the politician either 
reasserting a challenged claim, or expressing brief disagreement with the IFS analysis being 
put to them. The journalist would then continue to use the IFS’s views, with no discussion of 
why they could be incorrect or whether the IFS should be used as an authority in this way. 
Only one interview went beyond brief disagreement and involved criticism of how the 
IFS’s analyses were produced. This came from SNP leader Nicola Sturgeon when she 
responded to the use of IFS reports to challenge claims that the SNP could not end austerity 
in an independent Scotland. In an interview for Newsnight, Sturgeon told BBC political 
reporter Laura Kuenssberg: “If you are referring to the IFS report today when you talk about 
independent assessment, I don’t accept much of the underpinning assumptions made in the 
IFS report” before going on to give reasons why “the IFS have got it wrong about the SNP 
plans.” Sturgeon was willing to go further than all the other politicians in mainstream 
broadcast news during the 2015 campaign because she wanted to argue that the IFS was 
aligned with the Westminster elite in London. Despite arguing that the IFS’s criticism was 
based on false assumptions, however, Sturgeon stopped short of overtly questioning 
Kuenssberg’s construction of the think tank as providing an “independent assessment” and 
during the same interview she even accepted what she termed the IFS’s “praise” for the 
SNP.12
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Conclusion
During the 2015 U.K. general election campaign, whatever the IFS said was consistently 
treated as fact. While contested authority signaling did occur, it was ineffective for 
challenging the role of the IFS as a primary definer, especially in the face of the 
overwhelming weight of assumed and overt authority signaling we identified. Given these 
findings, our concern is that the “dance” between political elites and journalists, in a field of 
news that is crucially important, becomes a superficial and ritualized exchange. 
During the 2015 campaign, assumed authority signaling was the most prevalent way 
in which the IFS was constructed by broadcasters. When assumed authority signaling was 
used the IFS’s status as an independent economic expert was neither questioned nor overtly 
established. As a result, the IFS’s role as the ultimate primary definer for economic policy 
news became entrenched in reporting; a matter of fact external to both journalists and 
politicians.  
Repeatedly constructed as an expert source in framing, focusing, realizing and 
closing, the IFS became a key part of the mediated reflexivity that now typifies broadcast 
political coverage (Davis, 2009). The upside is that constructing the authority of the IFS 
creates space for journalists to routinely weigh up politicians’ claims, while maintaining 
distance and impartiality. The downside is that this process renders the IFS’s views virtually 
incontestable. If impartiality involves journalism giving public voice to a diverse range of 
policy perspectives, UK journalists are falling short during elections. 
We also unearthed journalists’ frequent use of the term “belief” and its derivatives. 
This terminology reveals not only the broadcasters’ own faith in the infallibility of the IFS, 
but also places politicians in a position where they are unable to successfully contest the 
IFS’s authority. Whilst technically able to cast doubt on statistics from the IFS, doing so 
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becomes a futile exercise for politicians because journalists respond with the think tank’s 
supposed infallibility. Given its infallible status, politicians also naturally seek to use the IFS 
to support their own arguments. When both politicians and journalists use language that 
constructs the IFS as an assumed authority external to themselves, the true winner is the IFS 
itself. The repetitive and formulaic use of assumed authority signaling means this discursive 
move is not always obvious.  
Repeatedly constructing the IFS as an almost unchallenged authority has 
consequences for economic policy debates. The over-reliance on the IFS as an expert source 
comes at the expense of other voices, narrowing and limiting scope for debate. We have 
shown that the think tank is used as a source to provide a “check” on politicians, but this does 
not provide balance when the views of the IFS are so rarely contested. As we have argued, 
the persistent use of assumed authority signaling means that those whose arguments were on 
occasion juxtaposed with the IFS’s—politicians—did not have a genuine opportunity to 
contest the think tank’s authority, and in any case politicians had strong incentives for not 
doing so, for fear of appearing marginal to the common sense of economic debate.
Finally, where overt authority signaling was used, the IFS was constructed as 
possessing category entitlements and was contrasted with politicians, who were constructed 
as lacking those entitlements. The dominant assumption is that politicians, as partisan 
representatives, cannot be trusted to present information or arguments on economic policy. 
While it is obviously important that party policy is exposed to critique during election 
campaigns, the danger here is that, due to the authority signaling incentive structure we 
identify, legitimate and representative party views on economic policy become marginalized 
by the views of a single think tank and trust in politicians is likely to be eroded in the process. 
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Table 1. Broadcast News Programs Selected for Analysis
Channel Program Episodes 
analyzed
(N) 
Segments 
featuring 
IFS 
(N) 
Total 
duration of 
episodes 
analyzed 
(hours) 
Total duration 
of segments 
featuring IFS 
(hours) (and as 
a percentage of 
total episode 
hours) 
Mean 
duration of 
each segment 
featuring 
IFS 
(minutes) 
BBC1 News at Ten 27 9 12.9 0.56 (4.34%) 3.71 
BBC2 Newsnight 26 4 21.4 0.73 (3.41%) 10.94 
Channel 4  Channel 4 News 38 8 26.6 0.79 (2.97%) 5.92 
Channel 5  5 News Tonight 24 4 10.1 0.39 (3.86%) 5.88 
ITV ITV News at Ten 
& ITV News 
Tonight 
27 4 16.7 0.16 (0.96%) 2.4 
BBC Radio 4 Today 27 17 45.5 2.04 (4.48%) 7.18 
Mean 6.08 
Totals 169 46 133.2 4.67 (3.50%) 
Figure 1. Overview of authority signaling by news anchors and reporters in broadcast segments 
featuring the IFS (counts and percentages)
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Figure 2. Overview of authority signaling of the IFS by political party sources
Note: 28 instances of organizations authority signaling in the 25 segments that featured at least one organization signaling the IFS’s au
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Notes
1 We excluded Saturday editions of Today for efficiency’s sake: these feature less campaign news.
2 Inter-coder reliability ranged from .72 to 1 exceeding the acceptable minimum of 0.667. Our pilot 
and final coding frames, reliability tests, and links to online video of the programs are available for 
download in our online data and method file at 
http://files.andrewchadwick.com/journalism2018/data_and_method_file.zip
3 5 News Tonight, May 6, 2015. 
4 5 News Tonight, April 23, 2015. 
5 Today. April 7, 2015. 
6 Channel 4 News, March 30, 2015. 
7 BBC News at Ten, April 10, 2015; BBC News at Ten, April 13 2015. 
8 BBC News at Ten, April 23, 2015. 
9 ITV News at Ten, April 23, 2015. 
10 Newsnight, March 30, 2015.  
11 Today, April 9, 2015. 
12 Newsnight, April 23, 2015. 
